Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Evaluating fitness by integrating the highest payoff within the neighborhood promotes cooperation in social dilemmas


Author Info

  • Xia, Cheng-yi
  • Ma, Zhi-qin
  • Wang, Zhen
  • Wang, Juan
Registered author(s):


    In this paper, we propose a modified fitness evaluation mechanism, which integrates the environmental factors into the focal player’s fitness calculation, to investigate the evolution of cooperative behaviors in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Here, the fitness of a player is computed by combining the individual raw payoff and the highest payoff within the neighborhood, which is regulated by a single parameter termed as trust level η. We show, compared to the traditional version (η=0), that the cooperation level can be highly enhanced for η>0. Meanwhile, we illustrate the dynamical evolution of cooperators on the square lattice, and for different defection parameters b the FC−K curves are utilized to investigate the impact of noise during the strategy updates. Likely, the role of pursuing the highest payoff within the neighborhood also favors the survival of cooperators in the spatial snowdrift game. In addition, the sensibility of knowing the external factors is often not identical for all individuals and we consider the distributed trust level in which η is a distributed parameter, and the results indicate that pursuing the highest payoff in the neighborhood is also inspiring as a consequence of its positive effect on cooperation. The current results are highly instructive for us to further understand the maintenance and emergence of cooperation under the framework of evolutionary game theory.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications.

    Volume (Year): 391 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 24 ()
    Pages: 6440-6447

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:391:y:2012:i:24:p:6440-6447

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page:

    Related research

    Keywords: Fitness evaluation; Integrating the highest payoff; Social dilemmas; Cooperation promotion; Spatial structure;


    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Cui, Guang-Hai & Li, Ming-Chu & Fan, Xin-Xin & Deonauth, Nakema & Wang, Zhen, 2014. "Optimism when winning and cautiousness when losing promote cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 408(C), pages 181-189.


    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


    Access and download statistics


    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:391:y:2012:i:24:p:6440-6447. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.