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Does “game participation cost” affect the advantage of heterogeneous networks for evolving cooperation?

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  • Tanimoto, Jun
  • Yamauchi, Atsuo

Abstract

Masuda [N. Masuda, Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation, Proceedings of the Royal Society B 274 (2007) 1815–1821] reported that a game participation cost (expressed by adding same negative values to all four elements in a 2 × 2 payoff matrix) affects the advantage of heterogeneous networks in the evolution of cooperation. We show that this finding is not always true depending on the features of the network, indicating that participation costs help cooperation in certain situations rather than destroy it. In a weaker dilemma game on a scale free network derived from the Barabasi & Albert algorithm with a larger average degree, game participation cost helps rather than destroy the network reciprocity.

Suggested Citation

  • Tanimoto, Jun & Yamauchi, Atsuo, 2010. "Does “game participation cost” affect the advantage of heterogeneous networks for evolving cooperation?," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 389(11), pages 2284-2289.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:389:y:2010:i:11:p:2284-2289
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2010.01.033
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Jing & Wang, Jiang, 2018. "Locality based wealth rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 1-7.
    2. Xiaofeng Wang, 2021. "Costly Participation and The Evolution of Cooperation in the Repeated Public Goods Game," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 161-183, March.
    3. Tan, Huaiyu & He, Zhixue & Du, Chunpeng & Shi, Lei, 2023. "Fast-response and low-tolerance promotes cooperation in cascading system collapse," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).

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