IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/marpol/v32y2008i4p570-579.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

ITQs under illegal fishing: An application to the red shrimp fishery in Chile

Author

Listed:
  • Chávez, Carlos
  • González, Nuria
  • Salgado, Hugo

Abstract

We study an individual transferable quota system with imperfect enforcement. We apply a model of individual fisherman behavior to the red shrimp (Pleuroncodes monodon) fishery in central-southern Chile. Simulation results suggest that illegal fishing could generate a 21% increase in fishing effort, resulting in a 13% increase in catch and a 2% lower quota price in comparison with the results of a system that operates under perfect compliance. The results are sensitive to changes in the level of fish abundance, total allowable catch, and the design of enforcement to induce compliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Chávez, Carlos & González, Nuria & Salgado, Hugo, 2008. "ITQs under illegal fishing: An application to the red shrimp fishery in Chile," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 570-579, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:32:y:2008:i:4:p:570-579
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308-597X(07)00126-1
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Salgado, Hugo & Chávez, Carlos A. & Miller, Montserrat & Stranlund, John K., 2015. "ITQ markets with administrative costs: An application to the industrial common sardine and anchovy fishery in Chile," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 178-185.
    2. Hugo Salgado & Carlos Chávez, 2016. "Using Taxes to Deter Illegal Fishing in ITQ Systems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(4), pages 709-724, August.
    3. Chenyang Xu & Klaas van’t Veld, 2020. "Team Inspection in the Management of Common-Pool Resources When Corruption is Present," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 75(3), pages 553-584, March.
    4. Parés, Claudio & Dresdner, Jorge & Salgado, Hugo, 2015. "Who should set the total allowable catch? Social preferences and legitimacy in fisheries management institutions," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 36-43.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:32:y:2008:i:4:p:570-579. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.