An analytical framework for studying: compliance and legitimacy in fisheries management
AbstractIn this article an analytical framework for analysing compliance and legitimacy in fisheries management is developed. A precondition for sustainable and efficient fisheries management systems is that the imposed regulations can be controlled and enforced. Furthermore, the management costs shall be reasonable compared to the economic output to be obtained from the fisheries. The analytical framework is based on hypotheses from economic and sociological theories, i.e.: (a) fishers' compliance is determined by economic gains of breaking the rules compared to the risk of being detected, (b) compliance is also determined by the design of the management system and whether the imposed regulations are perceived as legitimate. This relates to both the procedures under which the regulations have been decided and to the contents of the regulations, and (c) institutions play a significant role in coordinating various interests in fisheries management and is further a mean to reduce high transaction costs in fisheries management.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Marine Policy.
Volume (Year): 27 (2003)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Compliance Fisheries management Institutions Legitimacy and transactions costs;
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- Kerri Brick & Martine Visser & Justine Burns, 2011.
"Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence from South African Fishing Communities,"
227, Economic Research Southern Africa.
- Kerri Brick & Martine Visser & Justine Burns, 2012. "Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence from South African Fishing Communities," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(1), pages 133-152.
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