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Contract costs, bank loans, and the cross-monitoring hypothesis

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Author Info
Booth, James R.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 31 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 25-41
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:31:y:1992:i:1:p:25-41

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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  1. Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2007. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," Working Paper 2006-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
  2. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Efraim Benmelech & Nittai K. Bergman, 2008. "Collateral Pricing," NBER Working Papers 13874, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. John, Kose & Lynch, Anthony W. & Puri, Manju, 2002. "Credit Ratings, Collateral and Loan Characteristics: Implications for Yield," Research Papers 1748, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  5. Allen Berger & Gregory Udell, 1994. "Lines of Credit and Relationship Lending in Small Firm Finance," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 94-11, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Galina Hale & João A. C. Santos, 2006. "Evidence on the costs and benefits of bond IPOs," Working Paper Series 2006-42, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
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