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A consistent bargaining set

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Author Info
Dutta, Bhaskar
Ray, Debraj
Sengupta, Kunal
Vohra, Rajiv

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYG981-5P/2/873a372516fc7c0245e3d9c22a81fde3
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 49 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 93-112
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:49:y:1989:i:1:p:93-112

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Implementing the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set," Working Papers 2001-24, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1993. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Working Papers _001, University of Chicago, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "One-deviation principle in coalition formation," Discussion Papers 35, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1999. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Working Papers 99-18, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Brennan Platt, 2009. "Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 361-381, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hideo Konishi & Thomas Quint & Jun Wako, 2000. "On the Shapley-Scarf Economy: The Case of Multiple Types of Indivisible Goods," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 484, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Massimiliano Amarante & Luigi Montrucchio, 2007. "Mas-Colell Bargaining Set of Large Games," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 63, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  9. Hideo Konishi & Debraj Ray, 2000. "Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 478, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 15 Apr 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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