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Optimal contracts with public ex post information

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Author Info
Riordan, Michael H.
Sappington, David E. M.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYH4NK-5P/2/62524a186f80161e34037da644c1bd64
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 45 (1988)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 189-199
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:45:y:1988:i:1:p:189-199

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Spiegel, Yossi, 2003. "Optimal State-Contingent Regulation under Limited Liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 3920, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina & Salvatore Piccolo, 2005. "Endogenous Managerial Contract," CSEF Working Papers 148, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jul 2006. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2004. "On the Optimal Use of Ex Ante Regulation and Ex Post Liability," IDEI Working Papers 274, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Cecile Aubert & Alain de Janvry & Elisabeth Sadoulet, 2004. "Creating Incentives for Micro-Credit Agents to Lend to the Poor," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series 988, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  5. Roland Strausz, . "Getting to Know your Agent: Interim Information in Long Term Contractual Relationships," Papers 014, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
  6. Roland Strausz, 2005. "Interim Information in Long Term Contracts," Discussion Papers 40, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2000. "Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection," IDEI Working Papers 95, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 5747, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Nien-Pen Liu & Dachrahn Wu, 2007. "Does a Non-verifiable Imperfect Informative Binary Signal Always Create a Strictly Positive Value?," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 10(7), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
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