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Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Thomson, William
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory .
Volume (Year): 42 (1987)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 50-58
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:42:y:1987:i:1:p:50-58Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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Engwerda, Jacob, 2006.
"On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution ,"
Discussion Paper
107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Engwerda, Jacob & Douven, Rudy C., 2005.
"On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution ,"
Discussion Paper
35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!] Jacob Engwerda & Rudy Douven, 2008.
"On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 265-279, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Douven, R.C. & Engwerda, J.C., 1995.
"Properties of N=Person Axiomatic Bargaining Solutions if the Pareto Frontier is Twice Differentiable and Strictly Concave ,"
Discussion Paper
50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Ross Cressman, Maria Gallego, 2005.
"On the Ranking of Bilateral Bargaining Opponents ,"
Working Papers
eg0043, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
[Downloadable!]
Nejat Anbarci, 2003.
"Relative Disagreement-Point Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions ,"
Working Papers
0302, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Younghwan In, 2008.
"On the relevance of alternatives in bargaining: generalized average pay-off solutions ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 251-264, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2009.
"Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions ,"
Economics Series
2009_14, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
[Downloadable!]
Jim Brennan & Joel Watson, 2002.
"The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation ,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
2002-10, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
[Downloadable!]
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