IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v192y2021ics0022053121000156.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Competitive insurance markets with unbounded cost

Author

Listed:
  • Levy, Yehuda John
  • Veiga, André

Abstract

Azevedo and Gottlieb (2017) (AG) define a notion of equilibrium that always exists in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (RS) model of competitive insurance markets, provided costs are bounded. However, equilibrium predictions are fragile: introducing an infinitesimal mass of high-cost individuals discretely increases all prices and reduces coverage for all individuals. We study sensitivity w.r.t. cost bounds by considering sequences of economies with increasing upper bounds of cost, and determining whether their equilibria converge. We present sufficient conditions under which AG equilibrium exists when cost is unbounded. For simple insurance markets, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for existence: surplus from insurance increases faster than linearly with expected cost. This condition is empirically common. If the condition fails, a higher bound on cost results in market unraveling: all prices diverge and, in the limit, an AG equilibrium does not exist. We use these results to show that the equilibrium for an insurance market with an unbounded continuum of types is characterized by a simple differential equation. We also provide examples of non-existence for a (single-product) market for lemons with unbounded cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Levy, Yehuda John & Veiga, André, 2021. "Competitive insurance markets with unbounded cost," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:192:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000156
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105198
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053121000156
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105198?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Adverse selection; Asymmetric information; Insurance; Equilibrium existence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:192:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000156. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.