The role of audit evidence in a strategic audit
AbstractThis study examines how audit risk (the probability of false acceptance) and its components change when the auditor obtains audit evidence in an acceptance sampling model. Inherent risk and audit risk increase with audit evidence if the auditee has a sufficiently strong incentive for committing fraud. Detection risk always increases when audit evidence is introduced. If the auditor has a sufficiently strong incentive for avoiding false rejection, audit risk also increases with audit evidence. The analysis indicates that requiring auditors to obtain information is not effective in preventing material misstatements in at least some instances.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Accounting and Public Policy.
Volume (Year): 28 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jaccpubpol
Strategic audits Audit risk Audit evidence Acceptance sampling;
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- Mohamed Zakari & Karim Menacere, 2012. "The challenges of the quality of audit evidence in Libya," African Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(1), pages 3-24.
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