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The economic consequences of accounting choice implications of costly contracting and monitoring

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Author Info
Holthausen, Robert W.
Leftwich, Richard W.
Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V87-45N4YRR-T/2/a2b11aeedbd70fa9adae1cb346eed32f
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Accounting and Economics.

Volume (Year): 5 (1983)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 77-117
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:5:y:1983:i::p:77-117

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  1. Roland Strausz, 2004. "Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations," Discussion Papers 27, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Jorge Farinha & Luis Filipe Viana, 2006. "Board structure and modified audit opinions: the case of the Portuguese Stock Exchange," CETE Discussion Papers 0609, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto. [Downloadable!]
  3. Roland Strausz, . "Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing," Papers 015, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ermans, C.J.C., 1996. "Financial disclosure : a closer look," Research Memorandum 722, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dino Falaschetti & Michael J. Orlando, 2004. "Is auditor independence endogenous: evidence and implications for public policy," Research Working Paper RWP 03-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
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