Consumer-benefited cartels under strategic capital investment competition
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 7 (1989)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
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- Hongbin Cai & Uday Rajan, 2005. "Incentive Compatible Collusion and Investment," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 6(1), pages 37-52, May.
- Bos Iwan & Pot Erik, 2010. "Welfare-Enhancing Hard Core Cartels," Research Memoranda 004, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Advantageous or Disadvantageous Semi-collusion Licensing in a Vertically Separated Industry," Industrial Organization 0211006, EconWPA.
- Vesala, Jukka, 1998. "Technological Transformation and Nonbank Competition in a Model of Retail Banking Oligopoly," Research Discussion Papers 8/1998, Bank of Finland.
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