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Privacy and platform competition

Author

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  • Dimakopoulos, Philipp D.
  • Sudaric, Slobodan

Abstract

We analyze platform competition where user data is collected to improve ad-targeting. Considering that users incur privacy costs, we show that the equilibrium level of data provision is distorted and can be inefficiently high or low: if overall competition is weak or if targeting benefits are low, too much private data is collected, and vice-versa. Further, we find that softer competition on either market side leads to more data collection, which implies substitutability between competition policy measures on both market sides. Moreover, if platforms engage in two-sided pricing, data provision is efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Sudaric, Slobodan, 2018. "Privacy and platform competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 686-713.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:61:y:2018:i:c:p:686-713
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.01.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Lefouili, Yassine & Toh, Ying Lei & Madio, Leonardo, 2017. "Privacy Regulation and Quality-Enhancing Innovation," TSE Working Papers 17-795, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2023.
    2. Sabatino, Lorien & Sapi, Geza, 2022. "Online privacy and market structure: Theory and evidence," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    3. Pauline Affeldt & Reinhold Kesler, 2021. "Competitors’ Reactions to Big Tech Acquisitions: Evidence from Mobile Apps," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1987, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Kesler, Reinhold & Kummer, Michael E. & Schulte, Patrick, 2019. "Competition and privacy in online markets: Evidence from the mobile app industry," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Congiu, Raffaele & Sabatino, Lorien & Sapi, Geza, 2022. "The Impact of Privacy Regulation on Web Traffic: Evidence From the GDPR," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    6. Michael L. Katz, 2019. "Multisided Platforms, Big Data, and a Little Antitrust Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(4), pages 695-716, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privacy; Platform competition; User data; Ad targeting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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