IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finana/v91y2024ics105752192300563x.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

M&A performance commitments and insider trading: ‘Listen to their words’ or ‘watch their actions’?

Author

Listed:
  • Fan, Cunbin
  • Zou, Guohao
  • Wang, Jiawen

Abstract

Whether performance commitment will become a tool for insiders to pursue self-interest through cashing out at a high price is an important issue worthy of research. While academics generally agree that performance commitments bring positive synergies to both sides of M&A, some scholars have begun to focus on the reasons and economic consequences behind the failure of performance commitments recently. Using data from 850 A-share listed firms in China over the period from 2008 to 2019, we examine the relationship between performance commitments and insider trading by the acquirer. The results show that the greater the degree of performance commitments, the larger the scale of stock sales by the acquirer's executives and the smaller the scale of their net stock purchases after the announcement of M&A, which exhibits heterogeneity across different corporate property rights and performance commitment characteristics. The above findings suggest that high performance commitment is a tool for insiders to “speculation”. This paper innovatively reveals the self-interested motives and negative economic consequences of signing high performance commitments from the view of insider trading, and it provides a new perspective for investors to recognize the investment risks.

Suggested Citation

  • Fan, Cunbin & Zou, Guohao & Wang, Jiawen, 2024. "M&A performance commitments and insider trading: ‘Listen to their words’ or ‘watch their actions’?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:91:y:2024:i:c:s105752192300563x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.103047
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S105752192300563X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irfa.2023.103047?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers and acquisitions; Performance commitment; Insider trading; Executive stock reduction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:91:y:2024:i:c:s105752192300563x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620166 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.