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Procedural Fairness and Tax Compliance

Author

Listed:
  • Hartner , Martina
  • Rechberger, Silvia
  • Kirchler, Erich
  • Schabmann, Alfred

    (University of Vienna (Austria))

Abstract

For taxpayers it is important to be treated in a procedurally fair and respectful manner, especially when being committed to pay their share of taxes and feeling identified with the nation. In case of perceived unfair treatment and processes of unfair decision making, taxpayers resist paying the whole amount of their taxes due. In this article the relationship between taxpayers’ treatment by tax authorities and non-compliance was further investigated. Based on the group engagement model (Tyler and Blader 2000, 2003), it was shown that procedural justice positively affects motivational postures of deference (Braithwaite 2003) and negatively affects motivational postures of defiance (Braithwaite 2003). Additionally, this relationship was partly mediated by national identity judgments. Regarding the influence on actual tax behavior, only a significant effect from motivational postures of defiance on non-compliance was obtained from the current data.

Suggested Citation

  • Hartner , Martina & Rechberger, Silvia & Kirchler, Erich & Schabmann, Alfred, 2008. "Procedural Fairness and Tax Compliance," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 137-152, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:38:y:2008:i:1:p:137-152
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax Compliance; Procedural Justice; Motivational Postures; Social Identity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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