Impact of dynamic compensation with resource feedback on the common pool resource game

Sustainable use of common resources such as fish, water or forests depends on cooperation among resource developers, which limits the exploitation level of agent to the socially optimal level. Ecological compensation is an important means to promote the sustainable exploitation of resources. This paper uses evolutionary game theory to consider the influence of dynamic compensation with resource feedback on social ecosystem. The results show that adopting a larger initial compensation intensity is beneficial for cooperation if the feedback intensity is small, and any initial compensation intensity has the same impact on the system if the feedback intensity is large. In the region composed of initial compensation intensity and feedback intensity, the compensation intensity exhibits two evolution processes: convergence and oscillation. In the convergent parameter region, the larger the initial compensation intensity or feedback intensity, the earlier the convergence time of the compensation intensity. In the parameter region of oscillation, the smaller the initial compensation intensity or the greater the feedback intensity, the greater the amplitude of the compensation intensity. In addition, under different combination of initial compensation intensity and feedback intensity, the fines ratio for ecological compensation that is most conducive to the evolution of social ecosystems varies. Specifically, when the initial compensation intensity and feedback intensity are small, the fines should not be used for ecological compensation. When the initial compensation intensity is large and the feedback intensity is small, or the feedback intensity is large, all the fines should be used for ecological compensation. When the feedback intensity is moderate, part of the fines should be used for ecological compensation. These findings provide guidance for the formulation of effective ecological compensation strategies.