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Are CFO debt-like compensation incentives associated with financial reporting quality?

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  • Kohlbeck, Mark
  • Luo, Xin

Abstract

We investigate whether CFO debt-like compensation incentives and their alignment with CEO debt-like compensation incentives are associated with financial reporting quality. He (2015) finds that CEO debt-like compensation incentives are associated with higher financial reporting quality. Consistent with agency theory, we extend He (2015) by considering CFO debt-like compensation incentives. Overall, we find that CFO debt-like compensation incentives are associated with better financial reporting quality while controlling for CEO debt-like compensation incentives. These effects are present when the CEO and CFO compensation incentives are aligned with the same party. Further, the CFO effect dominates that of the CEO when examining discretionary accruals, and complements the CEO effect for accrual quality. However, we are unable to find any evidence of an incremental joint effect from the alignment of the CEO and CFO debt-like compensation incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Kohlbeck, Mark & Luo, Xin, 2019. "Are CFO debt-like compensation incentives associated with financial reporting quality?," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-1.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:advacc:v:45:y:2019:i:c:4
    DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2019.03.001
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