Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets
Abstract
Rational herd behavior and informationally efficient security prices have long been considered to be mutually exclusive but for exceptional cases. In this paper we describe the conditions on the underlying information structure that are necessary and sufficient for informational herding and contrarianism. In a standard sequential security trading model, subject to sufficient noise trading, people herd if and only if, loosely, their information is sufficiently dispersed so that they consider extreme outcomes more likely than moderate ones. Likewise, people act as contrarians if and only if their information leads them to concentrate on middle values. Both herding and contrarianism generate more volatile prices, and they lower liquidity. They are also resilient phenomena, although by themselves herding trades are self enforcing whereas contrarian trades are self-defeating. We complete the characterization by providing conditions for the absence of herding and contrarianism.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 79 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (07)
Pages: 973-1026
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Park, A. & Sabourian, H., 2009. "Herding and Contrarian Behaviour in Financial Markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0939, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Baddeley, M. & Burke, C. & Schultz, W. & Tobler, P., 2012. "Herding in Financial Behaviour: A Behavioural and Neuroeconomic Analysis of Individual Differences," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1225, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Simon Jurkatis & Stephanie Kremer & Dieter Nautz, 2012. "Correlated Trades and Herd Behavior in the Stock Market," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2012-035, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Lof, Matthijs, 2012. "Rational Speculators, Contrarians and Excess Volatility," MPRA Paper 43490, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Testa, Alessia, 2012. "Path-Dependent Behavior with Asymmetric Information about Traders' Types," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 388, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Walther, A., 2012. "Asset price manipulation with several traders," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1242, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Andreas Park & Daniel Sgroi, 2008.
"When Herding and Contrarianism Foster Market Efficiency: A Financial Trading Experiment,"
Working Papers
tecipa-316, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Park, Andreas & Sgroi, Daniel, 2008. "When Herding and Contrarianism Foster Market Efficiency : A Financial Trading Experiment," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 854, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Helena Veiga & Marc Vorsatz, 2010. "Information aggregation in experimental asset markets in the presence of a manipulator," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 379-398, December.
- Ippei Fujiwara & Hibiki Ichiue & Yoshiyuki Nakazono & Yosuke Shigemi, 2012.
"Financial Markets Forecasts Revisited: Are they Rational, Herding or Bold?,"
IMES Discussion Paper Series
12-E-06, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
- Ippei Fujiwara & Hibiki Ichiue & Yoshiyuki Nakazono & Yosuke Shigemi, 2012. "Financial markets forecasts revisited: are they rational, herding or bold?," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 106, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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