Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment
AbstractA convex, compact, and possibly discontinuous better reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity that can be used to establish that a game is better reply secure and we show that this notion of continuity is satisfied by a large class of games. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 74 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
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