This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Andrew McLennan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Fix finite pure strategy sets S1 ,… ,Sn , and let S=S1×⋯×Sn . In our model of a random game the agents' payoffs are statistically independent, with each agent's payoff uniformly distributed on the unit sphere in R-super-S. For given nonempty T1⊂S1 ,… ,Tn⊂Sn we give a computationally implementable formula for the mean number of Nash equilibria in which each agent i's mixed strategy has support Ti. The formula is the product of two expressions. The first is the expected number of totally mixed equilibria for the truncated game obtained by eliminating pure strategies outside the sets Ti. The second may be construed as the "probability" that such an equilibrium remains an equilibrium when the strategies in the sets Si∖Ti become available. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00567.x
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 73 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
Pages: 141-174
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:73:y:2005:i:1:p:141-174

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Email:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/memb.asp?ref=0012-9682

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters,Ronald J.A.P., 2001. "Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games," Research Memoranda 009, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Wheatley, W. Parker, 2003. "Survival And Ownership Of Internet Marketplaces For Agriculture," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22214, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  3. Kolen, Antoon, 2006. "A genetic algorithm for the partial binary constraint satisfaction problem: an application to a frequency assignment problem," Research Memoranda 045, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  4. Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters,Ronald J.A.P, 2000. "Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games: Structure, Selection, and Computation," Research Memoranda 004, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "More strategies, more Nash equilibria," Game Theory and Information 0502001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Andreas Park & Lones Smith, 2008. "Caller Number Five and Related Timing Games," Working Papers tecipa-317, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All top Economics journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.