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Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions

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  • Swinkels, Jeroen M

Abstract

We consider discriminatory and uniform price auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly asymmetrically distributed and for multiple units. Our setting allows for aggregate uncertainty about demand and supply. In this setting, equilibria generally will be inefficient. Despite this, we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient if they are "large," and use this to derive an asymptotic characterization of revenue and bidding behavior.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 69 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 37-68

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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:69:y:2001:i:1:p:37-68

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Cited by:
  1. Martin W. Cripps & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2006. "Efficiency of Large Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 47-92, 01.
  2. Bulut, Harun & Koray, Semih, 2008. "Competition and Regulation Via Supply and Demand Functions in Oligopolistic-Oligopsonistic Markets," Staff General Research Papers 12930, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  3. Gábor Virág, 2013. "First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 129-163, January.
  4. Brett E Katzman, 2009. "Asymptotic properties of equilibrium in discriminatory and uniform price ipv multi-unit auctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 834-846.
  5. García, Diego & Urošević, Branko, 2013. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 526-549.
  6. Chakraborty, Indranil & Shyamalkumar, Nariankadu D., 2014. "Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 12-21.
  7. Bresky, Michal, 2013. "Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 205-217.
  8. Bodoh-Creed, Aaron, 2013. "Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2436-2466.
  9. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F., 2001. "Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 29-34, October.
  10. In-Koo Cho, 2004. "Monotonicity and Rationalizability in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2007. "The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 383-403, November.
  12. Ewerhart, Christian & Cassola, Nuno & Valla, Natacha, 2006. "Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations," Working Paper Series 0668, European Central Bank.
  13. Athey, Susan & Miller, David A., 2007. "Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
  14. Cassola, N. & Ewerhart , C. & Valla, N., 2006. "Declining Valuations and Equilibrium Bidding Central Bank Refinancing Operations," Working papers 151, Banque de France.
  15. Gadi Fibich & Arieh Gavious, 2010. "Large auctions with risk-averse bidders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 359-390, July.
  16. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-27, June.
  17. Gresik, Thomas A., 2001. "Rationing rules and European Central Bank auctions," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 793-808, November.
  18. Schummer, James, 2004. "Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 154-170, July.

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