How to Decide How to Decide How to. . . : Modeling Limited Rationality
AbstractIt seems inconsistent to model boundedly rational action choice by assuming that the agent chooses the optimal decision procedure. This criticism is not avoided by assuming that he chooses the optimal procedure to choose a procedure to . . . to choose an action. The author shows that, properly interpreted, this regress, continued transfinitely, generates a model representing the agent's perception of all his options, including every way to refine his perceptions. In this model, the agent surely must choose the perceived best option. Hence, it is not inconsistent to model limited rationality by assuming that the agent uses the "optimal" decision procedure. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 59 (1991)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
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