This paper examines the structure of the optimal contract that would be chosen by a self-interested trade union that represents the interests of some set of M members when it is assumed that there exists a pool of unemployed workers outside the union whose opportunity cost of working is such that they would, at least in some states of demand, have been employed in a competitive labor market. The authors compare wage and employment levels under such a contract with those that would be observed in competitive markets, in particular, focusing on the impact of the union on the employment opportunities and welfare of non-union members. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 99 (1989) Issue (Month): 394 (March) Pages: 177-86 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)