Disequilibrium and the Welfare-Maximising Levels of Government Spending, Taxation and Debt
AbstractA "disequilibrium" framework, which extends that of R. J. Barro and H. I. Grossman_(1971) and E. Malinvaud_(1977) to include overlapping generations and dynamics due to perfect foresight and t he accumulation of bonds and capital, is used to determine when a welfare-maximizing fiscal policy requires a higher level of government spending than in Walras ian equilibrium. When deficits are permitted, optimum spending either equals the Walrasian optimum, or differs in a way depending arbitrarily on preferences. When a balanced budget is imposed, two situations which may justify spending clearly above the Walrasian optimum are: _(1) when capital accumulation is included;_(2) when spending provides utility to consumers. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 97 (1987)
Issue (Month): 385 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Office of the Secretary-General, School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, UK
Phone: +44 1334 462479
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Edward Nelson, 2003.
"Money and the transmission mechanism in the optimizing IS-LM specification,"
2003-019, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Edward Nelson, 2004. "Money and the Transmission Mechanism in the Optimizing IS-LM Specification," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 36(5), pages 271-304, Supplemen.
- Nelson, Edward, 2003. "Money and the Transmission Mechanism in the Optimizing IS-LM Specification," CEPR Discussion Papers 3898, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ganelli, G., 2000.
"Useful Government Spending, Direct Crowding Out and Fiscal Policy Interdependence,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
547, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Ganelli, Giovanni, 2003. "Useful government spending, direct crowding-out and fiscal policy interdependence," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 87-103, February.
- Hammond, Peter & Traub, Stefan, 2012. "A Three-Stage Experimental Test of Revealed Preference," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 72, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Karl Farmer, 2013. "Financial Integration and EMU's External Imbalances in a Two-Country OLG Model," Graz Economics Papers 2013-07, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
- Yiannis Stournaras, 2005. "Aggregate Supply and Demand, the Real Exchange Rate and Oil Price Denomination," Working Papers 26, Bank of Greece.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.