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Eliciting Reservation Prices: Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Mechanisms vs. Markets

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  • Bohm, Peter
  • Linden, Johan
  • Sonnegard, Joakim
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    Abstract

    The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism is used in experimental economies as an incentive-compatible procedure for eliciting reservation prices. It is found here, where seller prices are elicited, that the mechanism is sensitive to the choice of upper bound of the randomly generated buyout prices. Hence, the mechanism cannot be generally incentive compatible in practice. Two ways to specify the upper bound are identified which make the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism yield mean seller prices that do not differ from those generated in an incentive-compatible market. The experimental market used here is designed so that traders are unable to influence transaction prices, even when the market is small. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

    Volume (Year): 107 (1997)
    Issue (Month): 443 (July)
    Pages: 1079-89

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    Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:107:y:1997:i:443:p:1079-89

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    Cited by:
    1. Arnaud Z. Dragicevic & David Ettinger, 2011. "Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, De Gruyter, vol. 2(2), pages 4.
    2. C. Mónica Capra & Shireen Meer & Kelli Lanier, 2006. "The Effects of Induced Mood on Bidding in Random N-th Price Auctions," Emory Economics 0607, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).

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