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Rationally Justifiable Play and the Theory of Non-cooperative Games

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  • Cubitt, Robin P
  • Sugden, Robert

Abstract

This paper defines the concept of a justifiable strategy, that of a justification theory (which shows strategies to be justifiable) and that of a complete justification theory (which for every strategy shows whether it is justifiable or not). An impossibility result is proved, showing that there can be no complete justification theory that includes the assumptions of expected utility maximization, common knowledge, and caution. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Cubitt, Robin P & Sugden, Robert, 1994. "Rationally Justifiable Play and the Theory of Non-cooperative Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(425), pages 798-803, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:104:y:1994:i:425:p:798-803
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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Attanasi & Aurora García-Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Aldo Montesano, 2015. "Bargaining over Strategies of Non-Cooperative Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(3), pages 1-26, August.
    2. Cubitt, Robin P. & Sugden, Robert, 2014. "Common Reasoning In Games: A Lewisian Analysis Of Common Knowledge Of Rationality," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(3), pages 285-329, November.
    3. Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden, 2008. "Common reasoning in games," Discussion Papers 2008-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    4. Attanasi, Giuseppe Marco & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2010. "Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals," TSE Working Papers 10-192, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    5. Cubitt, Robin P. & Sugden, Robert, 2014. "Common Reasoning In Games: A Lewisian Analysis Of Common Knowledge Of Rationality," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(3), pages 285-329, November.
    6. Francesco Cerigioni & Fabrizio Germano & Pedro Rey-Biel & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2019. "Higher orders of rationality and the structure of games," Economics Working Papers 1672, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. Robin Cubitt & Robert Sugden, 2005. "Common reasoning in games: a resolution of the paradoxes of ‘common knowledge of rationality’," Discussion Papers 2005-17, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    8. Robin Cubitt & Robert Sugden, 2005. "Common reasoning in games: a resolution of the paradoxes of ‘common knowledge of rationality’," Discussion Papers 2005-17, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    9. Attanasi, Giuseppe Marco & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2011. "An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals," TSE Working Papers 11-274, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    10. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2011. "An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals," LERNA Working Papers 11.23.357, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    11. Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden, 2008. "Common reasoning in games," Discussion Papers 2008-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    12. Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Another impossibility result for normal form games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 73-80, February.
    13. David Squires, 1998. "Impossibility theorems for normal form games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 67-81, January.

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