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No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees

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Author Info
Gravelle, Hugh
Waterson, Michael

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects on the litigation process of alternative contracts between plaintiffs and their lawyers. Three contracts are compared: normal (hourly fee), contingent mark up fees, and contingent share contracts. The focus is on the first two, a recent change in English law governing legal fees providing the motivation. The influences of the contract type on the acceptance of settlement offers, the settlement probability, the accident probability, the demand for trials, and the ex ante and ex post welfare of litigants are examined. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 103 (1993)
Issue (Month): 420 (September)
Pages: 1205-20
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:103:y:1993:i:420:p:1205-20

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  1. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray, 1999. "The reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 261-286, September. [Downloadable!]
  2. Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, . "Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1038, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, 2001. "A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1020, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gomez-Pomar, . "Cashing By The Hour: Why Large Lawfirms Prefer Hourly Fees Over Contingent Fees," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003-1-1056, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, 2001. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1023, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Alberto Casagrande & Marco Spallone, 2007. "Investigating the determinants of pretrial settlement rates: contingent versus non-contingent lawyers’ fees," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 1-13, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Peter Van Wijck & Ben Van Velthoven, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of the American and the Continental Rule for Allocating Legal Costs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 115-125, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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