IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecb/ecbart/201800051.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The evolution of the ECB’s accountability practices during the crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Fraccaroli, Nicolò
  • Giovannini, Alessandro
  • Jamet, Jean-Francois

Abstract

This article examines the evolution of the ECB’s accountability practices during the financial crisis. After describing the challenges stemming from the crisis and changes resulting from the conferral of new supervisory tasks on the ECB, it provides evidence on how the strengthening of the ECB’s accountability has taken shape in the context of its relationship with the European Parliament in line with the latter’s key role as provided for in the Treaties. The ECB and the European Parliament, building on the accountability framework enshrined in primary law, have increased the frequency of their interactions, made innovations regarding the format and sharpened the focus of their exchanges, allowing increased scrutiny of the ECB’s policies. This has provided the ECB with more opportunities to explain its decisions and demonstrate that it is acting in accordance with its democratic mandate, which is a fundamental pillar of its legitimacy. JEL Classification: E52, E58

Suggested Citation

  • Fraccaroli, Nicolò & Giovannini, Alessandro & Jamet, Jean-Francois, 2018. "The evolution of the ECB’s accountability practices during the crisis," Economic Bulletin Articles, European Central Bank, vol. 5.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbart:2018:0005:1
    Note: 2244726
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2018/html/ecb.ebart201805_01.en.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ehrmann, Michael & Blinder, Alan & De Haan, Jakob & ,, 2022. "Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?," CEPR Discussion Papers 17441, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Nicolò Fraccaroli & Alessandro Giovannini & Jean-François Jamet & Eric Persson, 2023. "Central Banks in Parliaments: A Text Analysis of the Parliamentary Hearings of the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and the Federal Reserve," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 19(2), pages 543-600, June.
    3. Adina Maricut‐Akbik, 2020. "Contesting the European Central Bank in Banking Supervision: Accountability in Practice at the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(5), pages 1199-1214, September.
    4. Hjalte Lokdam, 2020. "‘We Serve the People of Europe’: Reimagining the ECB's Political Master in the Wake of its Emergency Politics," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 978-998, July.
    5. Angino, Siria & Secola, Stefania, 2022. "Instinctive versus reflective trust in the European Central Bank," Working Paper Series 2660, European Central Bank.
    6. Jens van ‘t Klooster & Nik de Boer, 2023. "What to Do with the ECB's Secondary Mandate," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 730-746, May.
    7. Fraccaroli, Nicolò & Sowerbutts, Rhiannon & Whitworth, Andrew, 2020. "Does regulatory and supervisory independence affect financial stability?," Bank of England working papers 893, Bank of England.
    8. Dall’Orto Mas, Rodolfo & Vonessen, Benjamin & Fehlker, Christian & Arnold, Katrin, 2020. "The case for central bank independence: a review of key issues in the international debate," Occasional Paper Series 248, European Central Bank.
    9. Angino, Siria & Robitu, Robert, 2023. "One question at a time! A text mining analysis of the ECB Q&A session," Working Paper Series 2852, European Central Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank accountability; central banks; European Central Bank; European Parliament;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbart:2018:0005:1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Official Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/emieude.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.