Optimal Price Ceilings in a Common Value Auction

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Optimal Price Ceilings in a Common Value Auction

Author Info

Archishman Chakraborty () (Baruch College, City University of New York)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Archishman Chakraborty

Abstract

A simple common value auction is considered where it is optimal to set a ceiling price in addition to a reserve price. The ceiling price prevents the better informed bidder from outbidding the less informed bidders. This guarantees participation from the less informed bidders raising the seller's revenues. The seller is better off by selling the good in an auction with a price ceiling compared to selling the good at a fixed price.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 3 (2002)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 1-7
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-02c70005

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
Phone: 615-322-2920
Fax: 615-343-8495
Email:
Web page: http://www.economicsbulletin.com

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (John Conley).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Klemperer, P., 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," Economics Papers 1999-w12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
Other versions:
- Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Microeconomics 9903002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Klemperer, Paul, 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," CEPR Discussion Papers 2163, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors registered on the RePEc Author Service receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.