Random Matching and assignment under dichotomous preferences
AbstractWe consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical. Using randomization, many efficient and fair matching methods define strategyproof revelation mechanisms. Randomly selecting a priority ordering of the participants gives a simple example. Equalizing as much as possible the probability of getting an acceptable mate accross all participants stands out for its normative and incentives properties: the profile of probabilities is Lorenz dominant, and the revelation mechanism is groupstrategyproof for each side of the market. Our results apply to the random assignment problem as well.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 28 (2001)
Issue (Month): 19 ()
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