This paper adapts an incentive-compatible regulatory mechanism to the problem of taxing a foreign monopolist with unknown costs, when price and quantity contracts cannot be enforced. It is shown that the optimal mechanism involves an import licence fee, and yields zero expected revenue to the government. These results are of some significance for the implementation of the mechanism.
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Article provided by Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics in its journal Indian Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 33 (1998) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 97-104 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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