IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/dij/revfcs/v23y2020i4p85-111.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

émunération du conseil d’administration et du comité d’audit et gestion du résultat comptable

Author

Listed:
  • Caroline Talbot

    (École de gestion – Université de Sherbrooke)

  • Sylvie Berthelot

    (École de gestion - Université de Sherbrooke)

Abstract

(VF)Cette étude vise à déterminer si l’importance de la rémunération du conseil d’administration, et particulièrement du comité d’audit, permet de limiter l’ampleur de la gestion du résultat comptable. Les données proviennent des documents officiels des années 2011 à 2013 publiés par les entreprises manufacturières canadiennes. Bien que le but de la divulgation de ces sommes soit d’améliorer la transparence entre l’entreprise et l’actionnaire, les résultats obtenus démontrent que la rémunération du conseil d’administration n’est pas liée à la qualité de l’information financière. Toutefois, la rémunération du comité d’audit est négativement liée à l’ampleur des accruals discrétionnaires.(VA)This paper examines whether the compensation of members of boards of directors and audit committees are related to the level of earnings management. The data analyzed were derived from the annual reports and proxy circulars of all the manufacturing firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange for the period 2011 to 2013. Our results tend to show that board members’ compensation are not tied to earnings management, while compensation of audit committee members are negatively related to the use of discretionary accruals.

Suggested Citation

  • Caroline Talbot & Sylvie Berthelot, 2020. "émunération du conseil d’administration et du comité d’audit et gestion du résultat comptable," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 23(N° spécia), pages 85-111, february.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:23:y:2020:i:4:p:85-111
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.openedition.org/fcs/4514
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:23:y:2020:i:4:p:85-111. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Informatique Technique MSH Dijon (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.revues.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.