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Statut de cotation de l’acquéreur et ampleur de la prime d'acquisition - Acquirer listing status and size of the acquisition premium

Author

Listed:
  • Chamsa Fendri

    (ESDES Université Catholique de Lyon)

  • Pascal Nguyen

    (ESDES Université Catholique de Lyon)

Abstract

(VF)La convergence d’intérêts plus étroite entre actionnaires et dirigeants au sein des entreprises non cotées suggère que ces dernières sont moins tentées d’offrir des primes élevées pour effectuer une acquisition. Nous testons cette hypothèse à l’aide d’un échantillon de cibles françaises sur la période de 1990 à 2014. Nos résultats empiriques montrent que les entreprises non cotées offrent en moyenne des primes nettement inférieures à celles proposées par les entreprises cotées. La différence se manifeste surtout pour les acquisitions dont la prime est élevée. Conformément aux enseignements de la théorie de l’agence, il ressort que les entreprises non cotées sont plus soucieuses de protéger leur valeur en évitant de surpayer pour prendre le contrôle de la cible.(VA) The closer alignment of interests between managers and shareholders in private firms suggests that the latter are less likely to offer large premiums when considering an acquisition. We use a large sample of French targets over the period 1990-2014 to test this prediction. The results show that private firms offer significantly lower premiums relative to public firms. The difference is found mainly for acquisitions involving large premiums. Consistent with agency theory, private firms display a greater concern for shareholder value by avoiding overpaying for the target.

Suggested Citation

  • Chamsa Fendri & Pascal Nguyen, 2017. "Statut de cotation de l’acquéreur et ampleur de la prime d'acquisition - Acquirer listing status and size of the acquisition premium," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 20(3), pages 41-66, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:20:y:2017:i:3:p:41-66.
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    Keywords

    fusions et acquisitions; primes; entreprises non cotées; conflits d’agence; mergers and acquisitions; premium; private firms; agency conflicts.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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