The GATS and Financial Regulation: Time to Clear-House?

In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, European Union regulators introduced the mechanism of ‘third-country equivalence’ for non-European financial institutions to access the EU internal market. This article evaluates for the first time the GATS-consistency of the European rules on third-country clearinghouses. Through this exercise, the article sheds light on the tension between financial regulation and WTO law, exploring how these two different disciplines can be reconciled. Building on the international economic law principles of non-discrimination and transparency, the analysis reveals that the European financial regulation could negatively impact the access of smaller countries to the EU market. The regulation in question is assessed under the GATS Article VI (Domestic Regulation), Article II (MFN), Article VII (Recognition), and the Annex on Financial Services prudential carve-out. The findings of the European case study indicate that the vast flexibility that trade law has delegated to national regulators possibly has adverse effects on the liberalization of financial services. The article concludes that if WTO Members do not derogate from their GATS obligations and commitments, the stability of the financial system would not be jeopardized, while the prospect of international integration would be increased.