Permissibility and the Aggregation of Risks

Tom Dougherty has recently argued that non-consequentialists cannot accommodate our judgements about acceptable levels of risk-imposition. More specifically, he argues that the following two intuitively plausible claims are inconsistent: (i) that it is impermissible to provide small benefits to many people rather than saving the life of someone else, and (ii) that it is permissible to expose someone to a negligible risk of death in order to otherwise provide this person with a small benefit. Abandoning either principle has significant consequences: rejecting (i) requires rejecting an important argument against consequentialism and consequentialist approaches to beneficence; rejecting (ii) requires radically rethinking the way we live our lives, as we routinely expose individuals to negligible risks of death. This article shows that Dougherty's argument relies on a scope ambiguity involving permissibility. Once this ambiguity is resolved, Dougherty's argument fails.