The Consequences of Rejecting the Moral Relevance of the Doing–Allowing Distinction

The claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing enjoys a great intuitive appeal. If in addition to this claim, we reject the moral relevance of the doing–allowing distinction, then we should also accept the claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm allowing. Those who want to reject the conclusion of the above argument usually do so by defending the moral relevance of the doing–allowing distinction. In this short essay, I propose a different take on the argument in question. Instead of opting to reject its conclusion by defending the moral relevance of the doing–allowing distinction, I argue that the argument fails due to internal inconsistency. I argue that, once we reject the moral relevance of the doing–allowing distinction, we can no longer rely on the strong intuitive appeal of the claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing.