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Credibility and Commitment in Crisis Bargaining

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  • Fey, Mark
  • Meirowitz, Adam
  • Ramsay, Kristopher W.

Abstract

Although scholars of international security share a skepticism for the extent to which agreements can be externally enforced, much existing game-theoretic work involves strong forms of commitment. Building on the canonical model of crisis bargaining, this article analyzes the role of two forms of commitment in bargaining: the ability to commit to a settlement and the ability to commit to end negotiations and initiate war fighting. The findings show that, contrary to expectations, allowing a proposer to retract their offer after learning of its acceptance does not lead to greater demands. Instead, a rational actor can be best off if he or she honors the accepted agreement in crisis bargaining, even though the act of accepting an offer changes the proposer's beliefs about the probability that an offer is acceptable. However, allowing a proposer to continue bargaining in lieu of fighting does change the dynamics of bargaining, although this effect diminishes as players become more patient. Finally, when there is no commitment to offers (or fighting after a rejected proposal), the behavior is the same as that found in the model with only renegotiation of agreements, and thus mirrors the behavior in the model in which both forms of commitment are present.

Suggested Citation

  • Fey, Mark & Meirowitz, Adam & Ramsay, Kristopher W., 2013. "Credibility and Commitment in Crisis Bargaining," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 27-52, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:pscirm:v:1:y:2013:i:01:p:27-52_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Klein, Gordon & Rebolledo, Mayra, 2020. "Uncertainty and bargaining: A structural econometric approach," CAWM Discussion Papers 114, University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP).
    2. Oriana Skylar Mastro & David A Siegel, 2023. "Talking to the enemy: Explaining the emergence of peace talks in interstate war," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(3), pages 182-203, July.

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