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Author Info
KIRMAN, ALAN

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Abstract

This issue contributes to the discussion of the relation between individual and aggregate behavior. The basic feature of all the models presented is that they allow for direct interaction between the individuals. This, it is shown, leads to a number of interesting phenomena that are difficult to account for in standard models. The basic message is that the inclusion of heterogeneous interacting agents allows us to escape from the pitfalls associated with the reduction to a representative individual and furthermore to show that aggregates will, in general, have behavior that is different from that of the component individuals. Lastly, complex aggregate behavior is not necessarily the result of complicated individual reasoning, it can emerge from very simple rule following by individuals.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Macroeconomic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 11 (2007)
Issue (Month): S1 (November)
Pages: 1-7
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Handle: RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:11:y:2007:i:s1:p:1-7_06

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  2. Heinemann, Maik, 1997. "Convergence of Adaptive Learning and the Concept of Expectational Stability in Linear Rational Expectations Models with Multiple Equilibria," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-207, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2002. "Advances In The Theory Of Large Cooperative Games And Applications To Club Theory : The Side Payments Case," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 641, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Rabah Amir, 1987. "Sequential Games of Resource Extraction: Existence of Nash Equilibria," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 825, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Coggins, Jay S. & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore & Roe, Terry L., 1988. "Existence of Equilibria in Lobbying Economics," Bulletins 7468, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center. [Downloadable!]
  8. Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Shih-Fen Cheng & Evan Leung & Kevin M. Lochner & Kevin O'Malley & Daniel M. Reeves & L. Julian Schvartzman & Michael P. Wellman, 2003. "Walverine: A Walrasian Trading Agent," Computational Economics 0302003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-31.


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