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The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types

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  • Kennelly, Arthur
  • Fantino, Edmund

Abstract

Economic games involving allocation of resources have been a useful tool for the study of decision making for both psychologists and economists. In two experiments involving a repeated-trials game over twenty opportunities, undergraduates made choices to distribute resources between themselves and an unseen, passive other either optimally (for themselves) but non-competitively, equally but non-optimally, or least optimally but competitively. Surprisingly, whether participants were told that the anonymous other was another student or a computer did not matter. Using such terms as “game” and “player” in the course of the session was associated with an increased frequency of competitive behavior. Males were more optimal than females: a gender-by-incentive interaction was found in the first experiment. In agreement with prior research, participants whose resources were backed by monetary incentive acted the most optimally. Overall, equality was the modal strategy employed, although it is clear that motivational context affects the allocation of resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Kennelly, Arthur & Fantino, Edmund, 2007. "The Sharing Game: Fairness in resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient types," Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(3), pages 204-216, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:judgdm:v:2:y:2007:i:3:p:204-216_4
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