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The effect of incentive structure on search in the secretary problem

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  • Hsiao, Yu-Chin
  • Kemp, Simon

Abstract

We tested the effectiveness of performance-based incentive structures using three incentive structures — commission base, best only and flat fee — and two levels of context — no context and house-selling — in an experiment in which participants made decisions in a variant of the secretary problem. Key measures of performance were the amount of search and the rounds in which the very best (optimal) offer was chosen. We found that having a commission-based proportional incentive did not produce better performance than having a flat payment for any of the performance measures considered. However, another performance-based incentive — the best only — increased the length of their searches and led to more optimal offers. These results applied both when there was no context and when the context was selling a house.

Suggested Citation

  • Hsiao, Yu-Chin & Kemp, Simon, 2020. "The effect of incentive structure on search in the secretary problem," Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 82-92, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:judgdm:v:15:y:2020:i:1:p:82-92_6
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