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Ties that count: explaining interest group access to policymakers

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  • Beyers, Jan
  • Braun, Caelesta

Abstract

The degree to which interest groups gain access to policymakers has often been explained by focusing on the exchange of resources in a dyadic relation between interest groups and policymakers. This article argues that the position an interest group occupies within a coalition and the relations it has outside its coalition substantially affect the likelihood of gaining access to policymakers. Our empirical focus is on the Dutch interest group system for which we examine how coalitions among groups and the network position of interest groups within and between such coalitions shape access. The analysis, based on data collected among 107 Dutch interest groups and 28 policymakers, leads to the conclusion that network positions count differently for elected and non-elected officials, and that network ties that bridge different coalitions add significant explanatory leverage to resource-based explanations of access.

Suggested Citation

  • Beyers, Jan & Braun, Caelesta, 2014. "Ties that count: explaining interest group access to policymakers," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(1), pages 93-121, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jnlpup:v:34:y:2014:i:01:p:93-121_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Federico Holm & Ramiro Berardo, 2020. "Coalitional Architecture of Climate Change Litigation Networks in the United States," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 37(6), pages 797-822, November.
    2. Katherine Cullerton & Tom White & Amanda Lee, 2019. "Doctors Rule: An Analysis of Health Ministers’ Diaries in Australia," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(13), pages 1-9, July.
    3. Nuria Font & Ixchel Pérez‐Durán, 2023. "Legislative Transparency in the European Parliament: Disclosing Legislators' Meetings with Interest Groups," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 379-396, March.
    4. Normann, Håkon Endresen, 2017. "Policy networks in energy transitions: The cases of carbon capture and storage and offshore wind in Norway," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 80-93.
    5. Nayara F. Macedo de Medeiros Albrecht, 2023. "Bureaucrats, interest groups and policymaking: a comprehensive overview from the turn of the century," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10, December.
    6. Anshu Rani & H. N. Shivaprasad, 2021. "Revisiting the antecedent of electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) during COVID-19 Pandemic," DECISION: Official Journal of the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Springer;Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, vol. 48(4), pages 419-432, December.
    7. Matti Van Hecke & Peter Bursens & Jan Beyers, 2016. "You'll Never Lobby Alone. Explaining the Participation of Sub-national Authorities in the European Commission's Open Consultations," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(6), pages 1433-1448, November.
    8. Adam W. Chalmers, 2020. "Unity and conflict: Explaining financial industry lobbying success in European Union public consultations," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(3), pages 391-408, July.
    9. Creutzburg, Leonard & Lieberherr, Eva, 2021. "To log or not to log? Actor preferences and networks in Swiss forest policy," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    10. Andrew Barron & Peter Hultén, 2014. "Exploring Corporate Lobbyists' Perceptions of Prospective Coalition Partners in Brussels," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 32(6), pages 963-981, December.

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