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Possession is Nine-Tenths of the Law: possession, property, and coordination in a Hawk–Dove Experiment

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  • Fabbri, Marco
  • Rizzolli, Matteo
  • Maruotti, Antonello

Abstract

In all legal systems, possession and property are inextricably linked. Game theory captures this relationship in the Hawk–Dove game: players competing for an asset are better off when the possessor plays Hawk and the intruder plays Dove (the bourgeois strategy) so that property can emerge as a spontaneous convention. This theory has been supported by large experimental evidence with animals. This paper presents a lab experiment where possession is manipulated to study the emergence of the property convention with human subjects. We show that the highest coordination emerges when possession is achieved meritoriously and that possession induces only bourgeois coordination (never antibourgeois).

Suggested Citation

  • Fabbri, Marco & Rizzolli, Matteo & Maruotti, Antonello, 2021. "Possession is Nine-Tenths of the Law: possession, property, and coordination in a Hawk–Dove Experiment," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 267-288, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:17:y:2021:i:2:p:267-288_6
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