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Public Voting and Prosocial Behavior

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  • Morton, Rebecca B.
  • Ou, Kai

Abstract

One argument against secret ballots is that such procedures lead to more selfish voting behavior and that public voting can increase prosocial voting and the likelihood of prosocial outcomes when voters are not subject to intimidation and coercion from outside interests. We investigate this supposition as well as voter preferences over observability in voting in this context. We find that voters are significantly more likely to choose unselfishly when voting is public. These differences in behavior advantage prosocial choices in elections (by 27%) when voting is public. Moreover, voters appear to recognize these differences and a substantial minority of voters whose selfish preference is not the prosocial choice willingly choose public voting even though the likely outcome will be costly to themselves.

Suggested Citation

  • Morton, Rebecca B. & Ou, Kai, 2019. "Public Voting and Prosocial Behavior," Journal of Experimental Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 141-158, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jexpos:v:6:y:2019:i:03:p:141-158_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kira Pronin & Jonathan Woon, 2023. "Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(4), pages 625-645, May.
    2. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Moumita Deb & Johannes Lohse & Rebecca McDonald, 2024. "The swing voter's curse revisited: Transparency's impact on committee voting," Discussion Papers 24-01, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    3. Jan Sauermann, 2021. "The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 1-20, January.
    4. Rebecca B. Morton & Kai Ou & Xiangdong Qin, 2022. "Analytical thinking, prosocial voting, and intergroup competition: experimental evidence from China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 363-385, June.
    5. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier, 2021. "Voting for compromises: alternative voting methods in polarized societies," ECON - Working Papers 394, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.

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