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The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization

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  • Busch, Marc L.
  • Pelc, Krzysztof J.

Abstract

International institutions often moderate the legal decisions they render. World Trade Organization (WTO) panels do this by exercising judicial economy. This practice, which is evident in 41 percent of all rulings, involves the decision not to rule on some of the litigants' arguments. The constraint is that it can be appealed. We argue that panels exercise judicial economy when the wider membership is ambivalent about the future consequences of a broader ruling. This is proxied by the “mixed†(that is, nonpartisan) third-party submissions, which are informative because they are costly, jeopardizing a more decisive legal victory that would benefit these governments too. We empirically test this hypothesis, and find that mixed third-party submissions increase the odds of judicial economy by upwards of 68 percent. This suggests that panels invoke judicial economy to politically appease the wider WTO membership, and not just to gain the litigants' compliance in the case at hand.

Suggested Citation

  • Busch, Marc L. & Pelc, Krzysztof J., 2010. "The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 257-279, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:64:y:2010:i:02:p:257-279_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Horn, Henrik, 2013. "The Time WTO Panels Require to Issue Reports," Working Paper Series 979, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Aydin B. Yildirim & J. Tyson Chatagnier & Arlo Poletti & Dirk De Bièvre, 2018. "The internationalization of production and the politics of compliance in WTO disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 49-75, March.
    3. Kazutaka Takechi, 2023. "How are the precedents of trade policy rules made under the World Trade Organization?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3), pages 806-821, November.
    4. Julia Gray & Jonathan Slapin, 2012. "How effective are preferential trade agreements? Ask the experts," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 309-333, September.
    5. Leslie Johns & Calvin Thrall & Rachel L. Wellhausen, 2020. "Judicial economy and moving bars in international investment arbitration," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 923-945, October.
    6. Christina Davis, 2015. "The political logic of dispute settlement: Introduction to the special issue," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 107-117, June.
    7. Tana Johnson, 2015. "Information revelation and structural supremacy: The World Trade Organization’s incorporation of environmental policy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 207-229, June.
    8. Bart Kerremans, 2022. "Divergence Across the Atlantic? US Skepticism Meets the EU and the WTO’s Appellate Body," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 10(2), pages 208-218.
    9. Ryan Brutger & Julia Morse, 2015. "Balancing law and politics: Judicial incentives in WTO dispute settlement," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 179-205, June.

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