In Lisa Blaydes s article, Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC, (International Organization, Spring 2004), the oil production of members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) depends on the extent to which they discount future gains. This comment discusses computer-related errors in the original article and determines how the results change when the errors are rectified. I then add country fixed effects and some additional control variables to the corrected models.I would like to thank Lisa Blaydes for data and helpful discussions and to thank Jim Alt and Mike Kellerman for comments on previous drafts. All remaining errors are my own.
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