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Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy

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  • Goddard, Stacie E.

Abstract

In Jerusalem, Ireland, Kosovo, and Kashmir, indivisible territory underlies much of international conflict. I argue whether or not territory appears indivisible depends on how actors legitimate their claims to territory during negotiations. Although actors choose their legitimations strategically, in order to gain a political advantage at the bargaining table, legitimation strategies have unintended structural consequences: by resonating with some actors and not others, legitimations either build ties between coalitions and allow each side to recognize the legitimacy of each other's claims, or else lock actors into bargaining positions where they are unable to recognize the legitimacy of their opponent's demands. When the latter happens, actors come to negotiations with incompatible claims, constructing the territory as indivisible. I apply this legitimation theory to Ulster, arguing this territory's indivisibility was not inevitable, but a product of actors' legitimation strategies as they battled for support over the issue of Ireland's right to self-rule.For comments on this article, I thank Fiona Adamson, Tim Crawford, Consuelo Cruz, Ron Hassner, Jeff Herbst, Robert Jervis, Robert Keohane, Ron Krebs, Paul MacDonald, Daniel Nexon, John Padgett, Dan Reiter, Jack Snyder, Monica Toft, two anonymous reviewers, as well as participants in a seminar at the John M. Olin Institute at Harvard University. In addition, the John M. Olin Institute, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Center for International Studies at Princeton University, and the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California all provided support for this project.

Suggested Citation

  • Goddard, Stacie E., 2006. "Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 35-68, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:60:y:2006:i:01:p:35-68_06
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Binder & Monika Heupel, 2020. "Rising Powers, UN Security Council Reform, and the Failure of Rhetorical Coercion," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 11(S3), pages 93-103, October.
    2. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    3. Thomas Gries & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2016. "An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War'," Working Papers CIE 95, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    4. Nam Kyu Kim, 2020. "Territorial disputes and individual willingness to fight," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(3), pages 406-421, May.
    5. Wong, P-H., 2014. "Insurgents in motion: Counterinsurgency and insurgency relocation in Iraq," MERIT Working Papers 2014-045, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    6. Thorin M. Wright, 2020. "Revisionist Conflict and State Repression," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 23(1), pages 49-72, March.
    7. Douglas Irvin-Erickson, 2017. "Genocide Discourses: American and Russian Strategic Narratives of Conflict in Iraq and Ukraine," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 5(3), pages 130-145.
    8. Charles H. Anderton & John R. Carter, 2011. "A Bargaining Theory Perspective on War," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. J. Patrick Rhamey Jr & Bryan R. Early, 2013. "Going for the gold: Status-seeking behavior and Olympic performance," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 16(3), pages 244-261, September.
    10. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370.
    11. Gries, Thomas & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2016. "An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War' '- Compromise for Peace versus Conventional, Guerilla, or Terrorist Warfare," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145617, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    12. Shawna K. Metzger, 2017. "Time is on my side? The impact of timing and dispute type on militarized conflict duration," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 308-329, May.
    13. Alexander Libman, 2015. "Words or deeds: what matters? On the role of symbolic action in political decentralization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 801-838, November.
    14. Gries Thomas & Haake Claus-Jochen, 2016. "Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War: Ideology and Beliefs, Indivisibles and Time Preferences," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 22(4), pages 377-384, December.
    15. Jijian Fan, 2023. "Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(5), pages 1-8, September.

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