Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility
AbstractHow can the corsets of international agreements be made more flexibleand therefore more robust? Or, in the words of Jon Elster, how canUlysses be loosely bound to the mast? This is an important question forthe simple reason that international cooperation is important, andinternational cooperation is often institutionalized in the form ofinternational agreements. Existing international agreements aretestament to states willingness and ability to cooperate despite theinternational anarchy in which they find themselves. Given the difculties of cooperation under anarchy documented in the recentinternational relations literature, understanding how states manage tobring about the formal cooperation embodied in international agreementsis of both theoretical and practical interest.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal International Organization.
Volume (Year): 55 (2001)
Issue (Month): 02 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU UK
Fax: +44 (0)1223 325150
Web page: http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_INOProvider-Email:email@example.com
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nathan Jensen, 2007.
"International institutions and market expectations: Stock price responses to the WTO ruling on the 2002 U.S. steel tariffs,"
The Review of International Organizations,
Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 261-280, September.
- Nathan M Jensen, 2005. "International Institutions and Market Expectations: Stock Price Responses to the WTO Ruling on the 2002 U.S. Steel Tariffs," International Trade 0512008, EconWPA.
- Boockmann, Bernhard & Thurner, Paul W., 2002.
"Flexibility Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Treaties,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
02-44, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- B. Boockmann & Paul Thurner, 2006. "Flexibility provisions in multilateral environmental treaties," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-135, June.
- Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-140, July.
- Bernauer, Thomas & Kalbhenn, Anna & Koubi, Vally & Ruoff, Gabi, 2010. "On commitment levels and compliance mechanisms: Determinants of participation in global environmental agreements," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 94, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Waters).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.