What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU–U.S. Trade Negotiations
AbstractLet s unite. And the world will listen to us was an ad campaignused to mobilize the pro-European camp in France during the 1992referendum on the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. This slogansummarizes well one of the central rationales for trade integration: bypooling together their resources and creating a large market attractiveto foreign trading interests, the constituent members of the EuropeanUnion (EU) can obtain greater international leverage than they would byacting individually. From the creation of the European Community (EC) in1957, member countries accepted the principle of a single external voicein trade and therefore transferred their sovereignty over trade policyto the supranational level.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal International Organization.
Volume (Year): 54 (2000)
Issue (Month): 01 (December)
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