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A model of rural conflict: violence and land reform policy in Brazil

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  • ALSTON, LEE J.
  • LIBECAP, GARY D.
  • MUELLER, BERNARDO

Abstract

This paper analyzes the underlying determinants of rural land conflicts in Brazil involving squatters, landowners, the federal government, the courts and INCRA, the land reform agency. A model is presented whereby squatters and landowners strategically choose to engage in violence. Landowners use violence as a means of increasing the likelihood of successful eviction of squatters, and squatters use violence to increase the probability that the farm will be expropriated in their favor as part of the government's land reform program. The model's predictions are tested using state level data for Brazil for 22 states from 1988 through 1995. It is shown that the government's land reform policy, which is based on expropriation and settlement projects, paradoxically may be encouraging both sides to engage in more violence, rather than reducing conflicts.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Environment and Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 4 (1999)
Issue (Month): 02 (May)
Pages: 135-160

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Handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:4:y:1999:i:02:p:135-160_00

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Cited by:
  1. Lee J. Alston & Bernardo Mueller, 2010. "Property Rights, Land Conflict and Tenancy in Brazil," NBER Working Papers 15771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Albuquerque Sant'Anna, André, 2012. "Land inequality and deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon," MPRA Paper 43793, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2012.
  3. Alan Dye & Sumner La Croix, 2013. "The Political Economy of Land Privatization in Argentina and Australia, 1810-1850: A Puzzle," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics 201311, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  4. Deacon, Robert & Mueller, Bernardo, 2004. "Political Economy and Natural Resource Use," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt68g1n1v8, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  5. Armelle Mazé & Claude Ménard, 2010. "Private Ordering, Collective Action, and the Self-Enforcing Range of Contracts. The Case of French Livestock Industry," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00624288, HAL.
  6. Engel, Stefanie & Palmer, Charles, 2008. "Payments for environmental services as an alternative to logging under weak property rights: The case of Indonesia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 799-809, May.
  7. Fernandez, Linda, 2006. "Natural resources, agriculture and property rights," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 359-373, May.
  8. Lee J. Alston & Edwyna Harris & Bernardo Mueller, 2009. "De Facto and De Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and Land Conflict on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University 607, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
  9. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00354960 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Gersbach, Hans & Siemers, Lars-H. R., 2010. "Land Reforms And Economic Development," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(04), pages 527-547, September.
  11. Maze, Armelle, 2006. "Multilateral reputation mechanisms and contract law in agriculture : complement or substitutes," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) 21285, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  12. Angelsen, Arild, 2007. "Forest cover change in space and time : combining the von Thunen and forest transition theories," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4117, The World Bank.
  13. Gerard Russo & Jaclyn R.K. Lindo & Sang-Hyop Lee & Rui Wang & Thamana Lekprichakul & Abdul Jabbar, 2012. "The Impact of State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) Expansion on Health Insurance Coverage in Hawaii," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics 201208, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  14. De Luca, Giacomo & Sekeris, Petros, 2009. "Land Inequality and Conflict Intensity," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Frankfurt a.M. 2009 5, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
  15. World Bank, 2001. "Mexico : Land Policy--A Decade after the Ejido Reform," World Bank Other Operational Studies 15460, The World Bank.
  16. Alan Dye & Sumner La Croix, 2012. "The Political Economy of Land Privatization in Argentina and Australia, 1810-1850," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics 201207, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  17. André Albuquerque Sant'Anna, 2014. "Land Inequality And Deforestation In Thebrazilian Amazon," Anais do XL Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 40th Brazilian Economics Meeting], ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Grad 198, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  18. Armelle Mazé & Claude Ménard, 2010. "Private ordering, collective action, and the self-enforcing range of contracts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 131-153, February.

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