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Carbon leakage: the role of sequential policy setting

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  • Sikdar, Shiva
  • Lapan, Harvey E.

Abstract

�We analyze non-cooperative environmental policy when the only strategic interaction between countries is through bilateral transboundary pollution, i.e., countries are�closed or small open economies. When countries set pollution taxes simultaneously,�there is no carbon leakage. However, in the sequential-move game, the leader sets its�pollution tax lower than the marginal damage from own pollution and lower than that�in the simultaneous-move game, while the follower sets its tax higher than that in the�simultaneous-move game. The only motive behind the leader's underregulation of own�pollution is to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution from the follower, i.e.,�to reduce carbon leakage. Aggregate pollution is higher in the sequential-move game�than in the simultaneous-move game if pollution is a pure global public bad.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Environment and Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 17 (2012)
Issue (Month): 01 (February)
Pages: 91-104

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Handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:17:y:2012:i:01:p:91-104_00

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